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Labor Law
By Robert W. Ashmore* and Michael H. Campbell**

During 1976, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals again issued a substantial number of decisions interpreting and applying the growing number of
federal statutes governing employer-employee relationships.' It is noteworthy that of nearly 60 cases reviewed, 29 were reversed, vacated or modified,
at least in part. Factors such as the high percentage of unorganized employees in the circuit and the consequent active union organizing efforts
provided the court with a wide variety of labor cases and with, perhaps,
greater familiarity with the law in this area than some other circuits have.
For whatever reasons, the court's decisions this term indicate that it is
continuing its active role in shaping the development of the federal labor
laws and in holding the various federal agencies accountable through
meaningful judicial review.
I.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

AcT 2

The Labor-Management Relations Act provides the basic statutory
scheme governing labor-management relations in most of the private sector. 3 As one might expect, this statute continues to be the subject of the
majority of labor cases decided by the court. There were 31 opinions published this year which dealt with a wide variety of issues under the LaborManagement Relations Act, including matters of employer interference
with protected employee rights, illegal union secondary boycotts, and the
right of an employer to pre-hearing discovery in National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) proceedings.
* Partner in the law firm of Fisher & Phillips, Atlanta, Georgia. B.A., Harvard University
(1962); J.D., University of Virginia (1969).
** Associate, in the law firm of Fisher & Phillips, Atlanta, Georgia. B.A., University of
Richmond (1971); J.D., University of Virginia (1974).
1. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §141 (1970); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C.A. §101 (1970); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §151 (1970); Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C.A. §651 (1970); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §201
(1970). For purposes of this article, the Fair Labor Standards Act includes the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.
2. This Act is also commonly known as the National Labor Relations Act as amended and
the Taft-Hartley Act.
3. The major private sector industries excluded from coverage of the National Labor
Relations Act include the railroad, airline and agricultural industries.
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Proceedings Under Sections 8 and 10:
Unfair Labor Practice Cases

Section 8(a)(l)-Actions of Employer on "Interference, Restraint, or
Coercion."' The cases based on allegations that employer actions constituted interference, ,restraint, and coercion in violation of §8(a)(1) of the
Act, although not particularly novel, illustrate the seemingly infinite number of employer actions which can be found to violate the restrictions of
this section.
In F. W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, the court in a per curiam opinion
upheld the Board's determination that the company violated §8(a)(1) by
collecting union literature placed on unattended desks and working stations before the working day and returning the material to the union by
mail. The court agreed with the Board that substantial evidence demonstrated that the company's objective in collecting and returning the material was not to protect its property interests but rather to discourage union
activity.
In NLRB v. United States Trucking Corp.,' the respondent trucking
company was awarded a contract for work that had been performed by
another firm, and the company assured the outgoing firm's employees of
continued employment. The company subsequently refused to retain in
employment seven employees because of their actual or believed involvement in a heated discussion with the new management about back pay
allegedly withheld by the outgoing firm. The court, agreeing with the
Board, held that the terminations violated §8(a)(1), because the employees' presentation of the back pay grievance was concerted activity protected by §7.
In Altex Ready-Mix Concrete Corp. v. NLRB, the Board found, and the
court agreed, that the filing of a labor-related civil action in a state court
is an activity protected by §7. Therefore, the company's termination of two
employees who had signed false affidavits submitted in that action violated §8(a)(1), since substantial evidence supported the finding that the
false affidavits were signed in good faith without intent to deceive.
4. 29 U.S.C.A. §158(a)(1) (1970) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C.A. §157 (1964) provides: "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in Section 158(a)(3) of this title."
5. 530 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1976).
6. 532 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1976).
7. 542 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Section 8(a)(2)-Improper Employer Aid to Union. 8 Only one major
case arising under §8(a)(2) was decided during the year. In Packerland
Packing Co. v. NLRB,1 the court upheld the Board's decision that the
company violated §8(a)(2) by extending recognition and signing a
collective-bargaining agreement with an independent union while the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters union was engaged in an organizational drive.
Without verifying all signatures on the petition presented by the independent union, the company had recognized that union and the next day had
negotiated a three-year agreement with it in 21/2 hours.
In upholding the Board's decision, however, the' court declined to consider the correctness of the Third Circuit's ruling in Suburban Transit
Corp. v. NLRB,'0 which held that summary recognition of a union commanding a majority of employees is permissible even if motivated by a
desire to freeze out an opposing union. In Packerland, the court found
grounds other than summary recognition and collective bargaining, including a discriminatory refusal to hire, to support the finding of unlawful
company assistance to the independent union.
Section 8(a)(3)-Discriminatory Actions of Employer Intended to
Encourage or Discourage Union Membership." In two routine cases,
NLRB v. Kent 2 and NLRB v. Rogers Brothers Wholesalers, 3 the court
approved the Board's determination that employees were discharged in
violation of §8(a)(3).
In another case, Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB," the court agreed with
the Board that two employees had been unlawfully terminated for union
activity, but disagreed with the Board's determination that a third employee had been terminated for pretextual reasons. The third employee,
who had made known his involvement in union activity, threatened and
cursed a foreman and claimed he was being pushed to work too hard.
Noting that "[s]ection 7 rights are a shield against employer retaliation,
not a sword with which one may threaten or curse supervisors,' 5 the court
held that there was no basis in the record for the finding that the employee
was discriminatorily terminated in violation of §8(a)(3)."
8. 29 U.S.C.A. §158(a)(2) (1970) provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it."
9. 537 F.2d 1343 (5th Cir. 1976).
10. 499 F.2d 78 (3rd Cir. 1974).
11. 29 U.S.C.A. §158(a)(3) (1970) provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

530 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1976).
526 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1976).
529 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1234.
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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Section 8(a)(5)-Employer's Duty to Bargain in Good Faith. 7 It is
settled that unless special circumstances exist, a union's majority statuss,
once established by a valid election, is irrebuttably presumed for a reasonable period, ordinarily one year following the Board's certification of the
union. "s
In NLRB v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc.,'9 the court enforced a Board ruling
that an employer's bargaining conduct during a certification year was
improperly influenced by the employer's intention to challenge the union's
majority status as soon as the union's certification year expired. In contract negotiations the employer had withdrawn its earlier proposal for a
contract term of three years and instead had proposed limiting the term
to the remaining nine days of the certification year. The employer had
been informed by an employee that a majority of its working employees
had sent the NLRB a petition repudiating the union. The court observed,
among other things, that the petitioners were less than half the potential
eligible voters, including strikers, nonstrikers and striker replacements,
and that the employer had advanced no legitimate business reasons for
withdrawing its original contract-term proposal.
It is more common for an employer to question a union's majority status
after the end of a certification year. After that protected period, there is a
rebuttable presumption of the union's continued majority status. An employer may rebut that presumption and lawfully refuse to bargain with the
union if it can show good faith and reasonable grounds for doubting the
union's continued majority status."
In two similar cases, NLRB v. A. W. Thompson, Inc.2 1 and NLRB v.
Hondo Drilling Co.,22 the court found Texas drilling companies liable for
§8(a)(5) violations after the employers had withdrawn recognition in unsuccessful attempts to rebut the presumption of a union's continued majority status.
In A. W. Thompson, the employer withdrew recognition three days before expiration of a contract between the parties. Factors relied on by the
employer as evidence of its "good faith doubt" included (1) the magnitude
of employee turnover; (2) the absence of union stewards and the failure to
17. 29 U.S.C.A. §158(a)(5) (1970).
18. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954); NLRB v. Leatherwood Drilling Co., 513 F.2d
270 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, U.S. , 96 S. Ct. 449, 46 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1975). The
"unusual circumstances" to which the Supreme Court referred in Brooks were: (1) the certified union was dissolved or became defunct; (2) as a result of a schism, substantially all the
members and officers of the certified union transferred their affiliation to a new local or
international; or (3) the size of the bargaining unit fluctuated radically within a short time.
19. 536 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1976).
20. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 597 n. 11 (1969); NLRB v. Leatherwood
Drilling Co., 513 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, U.S. -,
96 S. Ct. 449, 46 L.
Ed. 2d 387 (1975).
21. 525 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976).
22. 525 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1974).
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process grievances; (3) the failure of the union to use company bulletin
boards, as permitted by the contract; (4) the failure of the union to communicate with the company for a substantial period; and (5) unfavorable
employee comments about the union.
The court followed two of its prior decisions in holding that "employee
turnover is inherent in this [drilling] industry and cannot be given independent significance as a sign of union weakness."
The court rejected the company's argument that the union had failed
to take advantage of provisions in the contract for appointing stewards and
processing grievances. In the court's view, the company "was unable to
prove that the Union's failure in either respect reflcted adversely on its
responsibilities as bargaining representative."' According to the court, no
grievances were ever processed because none had ever been filed by the
employees and "there is nothing in the record to indicate employee discontent sufficient to justify the filing of grievances." Since one of the primary
duties of a steward is to resolve disputes among the employees and to
process grievances in their behalf, the court found it "without significance"
that no stewards had been appointed. 6
There was no apparent connection between the non-use of company
bulletin boards and the creation of a good-faith doubt about the union's
continued majority status, the court said.
The court also rejected the employer's contention that there had been
no communications from the union between May 29, 1973, and October 22,
1973. Surprisingly, the court went on to say that even if there had been no
communications during that period of almost five months, that fact
"would be rejected as evidence supporting a reasonable belief that the
Union had lost its majority."" The court refused to consider this evidence
because of the unique situation existing in the Permian Basin: the union's
low manpower and the geographic dispersal of the drilling companies operating in that area. 8
While the unusual labor-relations situation in the Permian Basin may
have justified imposing a heavier burden on an employer in showing goodfaith doubt of a union's loss of majority status, the court's approach categorically excluding certain kinds of evidence appears questionable. Cer23. Id. at 872, citing NLRB v. Leatherwood Drilling Co., 513 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, - U.S. -. , 96 S. Ct. 449, 46 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1975); NLRB v. Hondo Drilling
Co., 428 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1970).
24. 525 F.2d at 872.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Thompson was one of approximately 60 oil-well drilling contractors operating in the
Permian Basin, an area covering about 160,000 square miles in West Texas and New Mexico.
Thompson alone operated 11 rigs, which were spread over the area. Frequent relocations of
operations and high employee turnover are distinguishing features of that industry.
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tainly, the same result could have been reached by a more flexible evaluation of whether the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole. It would be unfortunate if such categorical exclusions were extended to good-faith doubt determinations in other employment contexts. -Not only is the employer denied the opportunity to present
the complete factual picture when a union is not performing its bargaining
obligations, but there is also the question whether it is in the best interests
of the unit employees to set such a low standard of union performance
during a contract term.
Another 1976 case determined the employer's bargaining obligations relating to changes in working conditions during the period between a
union's election victory and the signing of a contract. In NLRB v. Amoco
Chemicals Corp.," the court found that §8(a)(5) was violated when the
company, shortly after losing an election, began using written reprimands
to its drivers for infractions of company rules and regulations. Under the
new system, the employer's complaints tended to become a permanent
part of an employee's personnel file, which could affect the employee's job
security. The court adopted the Board's determination that Amoco's institution of more severe disciplinary procedures required prior notification
and consultation with the newly elected union.
The court also found the Board had properly assessed a §8(a)(5) violation after Amoco unilaterally reduced employee hours without conferring
or negotiating with the union. It was undisputed that a company official
had told supervisors to limit overtime and restrict the work force to a 40hour work week. That reduction necessarily affected the drivers' wages and
was considered a unilateral change in working conditions subject to mandatory collective bargaining.
Nevertheless, the court was unable to agree with the Board that a monetary award was an appropriate remedy for Amoco's failure to bargain about
the reduction in work hours. There had been no findings sufficient to
demonstrate that the employees suffered any economic loss as a result of
Amoco's failure to consult with the union before acting. On the record, the
court found if difficult to see how bargaining would have altered the result
or ameliorated the employees' losses. The court remanded the case, because without a more complete factual foundation, the Board could not
infer a loss and thereby justify its decision to award back pay.
Section 8(b)(l)-Actions of Union as Restraint or Coercion. Section
8(b)(1)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it "an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents ...

to restrain or coerce

. ..

an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. 3 The only 1976 case
29.
30.

529 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1976).
29 U.S.C.A. §158(b)(1)(B) (1970).
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involving this provision was an important one, in which the court refused
to extend the Supreme Court's holding in a major 1974 case.
In International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots, Marine
Division v. NLRB,3 ' the court enforced a Board order determining that the
Masters, Mates, and Pilots (MM&P) violated §8(b)(1)(B) by picketing two
United States merchant vessels whose licensed deck officers were represented by rival union, the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
(MEBA).
When MEBA emerged as the collective-bargaining representative of the
deck officers of two large new ships, MM&P picketed to replace the
MEBA-represented licensed deck officers with others represented by
MM&P, to obtain recognition as bargaining representative, and to induce
the employers to sign its standard collective-bargaining agreement.
The court of appeals agreed with the Board's determination that the
32
picketing by MM&P to obtain each of those objects violated §8(b)(1)(B).
In the court's view, implicit in §8(b)(1)(B) is the congressional judgment
that relations between an employer and its supervisory personnel should
be fully insulated from coercion by a labor union. According to the court,
"[slection 8(b)(1)(B) secures to the employer the unfettered right to select supervisory personnel, and its grounds for selection are not subject to
challenge in defense of a charged violation of that provision. '3 The court
of appeals distinguished FloridaPower & Light Co. v. InternationalBhd.
of Electrical Workers,3' in which the Supreme Court had held that no
§8(b)(1)(B) violation existed when a union had disciplined supervisory
members who crossed a picket line and performed struck work. The Supreme Court had held that a union's discipline of one of its members who
is a supervisory employee can constitute a violation of §8(b)(1)(B) only if
the discipline may adversely affect the supervisor's conduct in performing
the duties of, and acting in his capacity as, grievance adjuster or collective
bargainer on behalf of the employer.
In Florida Power & Light, the employer had taken the position that
supervisory personnel who were also members of the union were free to
decide on an individual basis whether they would cross the picket line. The
31. 539 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1976).
32. Licensed deck officers on large merchant vessels are "supervisors" within the meaning
of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §152(11), since one of their duties is the adjustment of grievances
that arise on shipboard. Therefore, they are also "representatives" for the purposes of
§8(b)(1)(B). However, MM&P represents, in addition to the licensed deck officers a small
contingent of unlicensed "employee" members. Because of its representation of these
"employee" members, MM&P is considered by the Board to be a "labor organization" as
defined in §2(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §152(5). As a "labor organization," MM&P enjoys
the protections embodied in §8(a) and suffers the restrictions imposed by §8(b) on its organizational and other activities.
33. 539 F.2d at 560.
34. 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
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statute speaks in terms of coercion of the employer, and the disciplinary
proceedings in FloridaPower & Light amounted to indirect coercion of the
employer at best. In Masters, Mates and Pilots, however, the union coercion was aimed directly at the employers themselves.
In view of the long-running jurisdictional dispute between MM&P and
MEBA, the court's restricted reading of Florida Power & Light provides
employers subjected to picketing over such disputes with a much-needed
avenue of relief.
Section 8(b)(4) -Secondary Boycotts. 5 The court in 1976 decided
only one secondary boycott case, Bexar Plumbing Co. v. NLRB.36 Bexar
had charged a union with secondary picketing at a common-situs construction site, a violation of §8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. When the Board dismissed the complaint, Bexar petitioned for review of the Board's action.
The picket signs had stated that Bexar was unfair to union plumbers in
paying substandard wages to its employees. Bexar did not challenge the
Board's conclusion that the picketing complied with the standards of
Moore Dry Dock,37 nor did Bexar allege a violation of the additional prerequisites of lawful common-situs picketing set forth by the Fifth Circuit in
Superior Derrick Corp. v. NLRB. 3 Bexar's attack was instead directed at
the Board's failure to assess the totality of the evidence properly and
conclude from it that an unlawful purpose existed despite the union's
compliance with the more "objective" requirements of Moore Dry Dock
and Superior Derrick.39
35. 29 U.S.C.A. §158(b)(4) (1970) provides in part that it is an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization "(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike
or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or to
enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e); (B) forcing or requiring any
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization had been certified
as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 ....
36. 536 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1976).
37. Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950).
38. 273 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1960).
39. In Moore Dry Dock, "the Board held that picketing of premises occupied by secondary
employers is lawful if (a) the picketing is strictly confined to the secondary employer's premises; (b) the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs at the time of
the picketing; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the
situs; and (d) the picketing clearly discloses that the dispute is with the primary employer."
Building & Constr. Trades Council of New Orleans (Markwell & Hartz, Inc.), 155 N.L.R.B.
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Bexar's principal argument focused on the limited information available
to the union about whether the company was actually paying substandard
wages. The sole evidence offered by the union on that point was the testimony of a union representative that he had once received limited information about what Bexar paid its apprentices.
In the court's view, the Board had failed to consider other probative facts
on the crucial issue of the union's object in picketing.'" While the union's
wage information related only to the apprentice wage scale, the only employee permanently assigned to the job site was not an apprentice, and the
picket signs were not limited to information about apprentices' wages.
Further, in the court's view, the Board had inadequately considered the
union's failure even to attempt to verify Bexar's wage rates with the company itself. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether that failure
to verify, standing alone, constituted a prima facie case of the alleged
unlawful object." Nevertheless, the failure to make any reasonable effort
at verification was considered probative of the issue of unlawful intent,
even though the union possessed some slight information about apprentice
wage rates.
The court also found that inadequate weight had been given to the
pattern of union picketing against Bexar. Rejecting the apparent reasoning
of the Board that the union's failure to picket Bexar's other jobs was a
factor in its favor, the court said: "To the contrary, we believe that the
union's selective picketing, absent any indication that Bexar's wages varied from job to job, strongly suggests that the picketing was designed to
maximize the likelihood of secondary effects rather than to publicize substandard wages in general."' 2
Bexar had also argued that the failure to picket Bexar's downtown headquarters 40 miles from the job site was highly probative of the union's
proscribed secondary object. Without ruling on that issue, the court criticized the Board's decision to give that factor minimal weight without a full
analysis of the employer's argument.
Pre-Hearing Discovery.

In a comprehensive opinion in Kent Corp. v.

319, 323 n. 9, aff'd, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967). The Moore Dry Dock standards have been
applied to common-situs picketing in the construction industry.
In Superior Derrick, it was established that despite technical compliance with the Moore
Dry Dock standards, a union's picketing may, by related conduct, reveal that the union's
object is secondary in nature.
40. The issue in such cases is the union's object rather than the effect of the picketing;
the picketing is illegal if an object is to cause a company's customers to cease doing business
with it or to force the company to go out of business, even though the picketing had other,
lawful objects.
41. Compare Sales Delivery Drivers, Local 296 (Alpha Beta Acme Mkts., Inc.), 205
N.L.R.B. 462, 473 n. 13 (1973), a case brought under 29 U.S.C.A. §158(b)(7).
42. 536 F.2d at 637.
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NLRB,'3 the court reviewed an employer's efforts to obtain disclosure of
NLRB documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)." The
documents in issue were "final investigation reports" prepared by staff
members of the NLRB's Tenth Regional Office after they had investigated
unfair-labor-practice charges filed against Kent. Some of the reports contained marginal notations made by the Regional Director and his staff
during a meeting at which they discussed the charges.
Kent contended that the documents with their notations, to the extent
they constituted decisions by the Regional Director not to issue an unfairlabor-practice complaint, were necessary to its defense of Board charges
and were disclosable under sections (a)(2) and (a)(3) of the FOIA.1" The
Government contended that the materials were protected from disclosure
by exemptions 5 and 7 of the Act.'"
After an in camera inspection, the district court ordered disclosure. The
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding many of the issues in the case to be governed
by NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co.' 7 Unlike Sears, however, in which the
Supreme Court considered actions of the NLRB General Counsel's office,
48
Kent turned on procedures at the Board's regional offices.
The NLRB's investigation was triggered by the filing of various unfairlabor-practice charges against Kent. A Board agent investigated the
charges, interviewed witnesses and gathered documentary evidence. He
then wrote a "final investigative report," summarizing the evidence and
recommending disposition of the charges. The report was discussed at a
43. 530 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976).
44. 5 U.S.C.A. §552 (1974). The FOIA was amended by Pub. L. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561-1564
(1974). Except where otherwise indicated, all citations to the FOIA are.to.the amended
statute.
45. 5 U.S.C.A. §552(a)(2) and (3) (1974).
46. 5 U.S.C.A. §552(b)(5) and (7) (1974) states:
This [Act] does not apply to matters that are
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel ....
47. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
48. Disclosure of documents like those involved in Kent Corp. were at issue in Seafarers
Int'l Union v. Baldovin, 508 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1975), but the controversy became moot before
it could be considered on the merits. 511 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1975).
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meeting attended by the investigator, the Regional Director and two regional office attorneys. As the participants discussed the report, the Regional Director gave oral directions about which alleged violations should
be pursued (with a view toward settlement or complaint) and which should
be dropped (by inducing a withdrawal of the charge, or by dismissal).
Several participants in the meeting made notes in the margins of their
copies of the report. Thereafter, a complaint was issued based upon some
of the charges.
During the resulting unfair-labor-practice litigation, Kent obtained in
district court a preliminary injunction directing the Board to produce those
parts of the investigation reports and marginal notes which constituted the
final decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute.
Under the FOIA, all federal agency records are prima facie disclosable
to any member of the public who tenders a request which "reasonably
describes" them.' 9 If the materials are among those described in FOIA
subsection (a)(2), including "final opinions . . . made in the adjudication
of cases" and "instructions to staff that affect a member of the public,"
the agency has an additional duty: It must not only release the documents
to the public,, but also must maintain and make available current indexes
listing those materials. The agency can escape these responsibilities only
if it sustains the burden of showing that the documents fall within one or
more of the exemptions in subsection (b).0
The primary questions before the court were whether the investigative
reports with their markings, or any portion of them, were "final opinions"
and, if not, whether they should be considered outside of exemption 5 for
any other reason. The court answered both questions in the negative."
None of the documents purported to explain why the Regional Director
had decided not to issue a complaint in the various instances. Instead, the
"final investigation reports" expressed only the tentative views of Board
attorneys and stated only reasons which could account for the Regional
Director's decisions. In the court's view, the presence of marginal notations
did not change the results, since there was no assurance that the notations
represented the institutional views of the regional office.52
The court construed exemption 5 to exempt only those documents normally privileged in civil discovery. The Board had relied on three distinct
privileges: the executive privilege, the attorney work-product privilege,
49. 5 U.S.C.A. §552(a)(3) (1974).
50. 5 U.S.C.A. §552(b) (1974).
51. 530 F.2d at 619. See Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Air Craft Eng. Corp., 421 U.S.
168 (1975), a companion case to Sears.
52. Id. at 620. While the court's conclusion with regard to exemption 5 was not based upon
Kent's motives, the court did say that Kent was trying to probe the mental processes and
motives of the individual decision-maker, rather than to question the objective legal validity
of the institutional decision. In the circumstances of the case, that effort was considered to
be improper.
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and (apparently) the so-called informer's privilege. The court was able to
decide the case by applying the work-product privilege alone.
In the court's view, even the factual matters in the reports were protected. The court considered that an attorney writing in contemplation of
forthcoming unfair-labor-practice litigation must be able not only to discuss doctrinal theories but also to assemble information and sift the relevant from the irrelevant facts, without feeling that he is working for his
adversary.
Kent was considered to be a particularly strong case for recognizing the
work-product privilege. The court said the contents of the reports were not
"primary information, 3' 3 such as verbatim witness testimony or objective
data, but rather were mainly reports on how the Board attorneys appraised
the evidence they found.
Nevertheless, the court said its holding did not mean that the "Final
Investigation Reports ' 54 of NLRB Regional Offices are always wholly
within the attorney work-product privilege. "In a closer case," the court
said, "the District Court might be obliged to consider, possibly through in
camera proceedings or the taking of extrinsic evidence, whether any portions of the records could be disclosed without offending work-product rule
policies.""5 Since the court found the documents to be protected in their
entirety by exemption 5, it was unnecessary to pass on the government's
alternative contention that the reports came within exemption 7.56
B.

Proceedings Under Section 9: Representation Cases

Right to Hearing on Objections. The Act does not require a postelection evidentiary hearing in a representation proceeding. When objections to conduct affecting the results of an election are filed by either an
employer or union, the Board will not automatically grant such a hearing. 57
This year, as in past years, a recurring question was whether an employer
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on its objections. In each case this
year, the court upheld the Board in denying the requested hearing.
In Federal Electric Corp. v. NLRB,55 for example, the employer requested an evidentiary hearing on its objection that the confusion of the
Board agent conducting the election affected the results. In upholding the
Board's denial of a hearing, the court concluded that its established test
for determining entitlement to an evidentiary hearing had not been satis53. Id. at 624.
54. Id.
55. Both exemptions 5 and 7 were applied in denying a similar discovery effort in Marathon Le Tourneau Co. v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D. Miss. 1976).
56. 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (1970).
57. 29 C.F.R. §102.69(f) (1976) provides for a Board hearing when "substantial and material factual issues" are presented.
58. 539 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1976).
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fled. "The company failed to make a prima facie case for such a hearing
because there is no evidence which if credited would justify setting aside
the election," the court said. 9
Similarly, in NLRB v. Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc., 0 the employer
filed objections to the election and refused to bargain. It complained that
a sample ballot included on an official Board notice of the election had
been altered to show a vote for the union, that an employee had been
threatened in an attempt to acquire her signature on a union authorization
card, and that a supervisor had participated in the propaganda campaign
on behalf of the union.
The court, once again in agreement with the Board, held that the employer was not entitled to a hearing on the issues raised. The court found
reasonable the Board's conclusion that, even if the allegation of ballotmarking were true, an employee would not believe that marking a sample
ballot signified government favoritism for the union. On the second issue,
the court accepted the Board's conclusion that insufficient evidence supported the allegation of employee threats and that one employee's demand
of another "for the last time" to sign a union authorization card was at best
only ambiguously a threat and not a basis for setting aside the election.
On the third issue, the court found reasonable the Board's conclusion that
an alleged supervisor's pro-union efforts did not affect the results of the
election, since the individual had been terminated from employment six
weeks prior to the election.
Objections to Election. By far the most interesting case about objections to an election was NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp.,6" which the court
noted at the outset was "by no means an easy case." 2 Sumter Plywood
refused to bargain with the union because of alleged union improprieties
during the organization campaign, and the Board sought enforcement of
its bargaining order.
The company initially objected that during the campaign the union
claimed there were no initiation fees or fines and thereby misrepresented
the costs of joining the union. The company relied on the union constitution, which authorized the imposition of initiation fees and fines. The
court, however, agreed with the Board that there had been no material
misrepresentation, since the standard practice had been for the union to
waive initiation fees irrespective of whether an employee supported the
union in the campaign. On the matter of fines, the court again agreed with
the Board that there had been no material misrepresentation, since apparently no fine had been levied on a member of an industrial local in the
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1044, citing Bush Hog, Inc. v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 1266, 1269 (5th Cir. 1969).
542 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1976).
535 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 919.
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preceding 17 years.
The company further objected to a union statement during the campaign to the effect that "if you do not sign the [authorization] card you
could not work at the plant after the union won the election." Noting the
wide margin of the union win (156-77) and the isolated nature of the
statement, apparently made two weeks before the election, the court concluded that the company did not show that this misrepresentation materially affected the actions of a great number of employees or that the company had an inadequate opportunity to reply and to correct the misrepresentation.
The company's major objection to the election was that the union engaged in a racially oriented campaign to organize the overwhelmingly
black electorate-204 out of 241 eligible voters. The company contended,
among other things, that some white employees were not invited to join
the union or to attend union meetings or given campaign literature. Conceding that the union campaign "evinced only a minimal interest in the
white voters,"13 the court refused to set aside the election because of racial
one-sidedness. Said the court: "This concentration on voters of one race,
to the relative exclusion of voters of the other, is disturbing and is not to
be condoned, but we feel that it is not enough in itself to invalidate the
election, at least in the absence of any indication either that whites were
absolutely excluded or that leading Union organizers deliberately promoted a policy excluding workers of one race from the campaign." 4
The company also contended that certain union remarks and union
literature, including a pamphlet depicting "Uncle Tom" as a roadblock to
unionism, were directly aimed at black voters to the exclusion of white
voters. The court reiterated its test set forth in NLRB v. Bancroft Manufacturing Co.6 for determining the validity of an election. Bancroft ruled
that the party injecting racial considerations into a campaign carries the
burden of persuasion if statements are racially inflammatory of if race
forms "the core or theme of the campaign."" In the absence of either
condition, the injection of racial considerations "should be reviewed under
the familiar standards applied to any other types of alleged material misre67
presentation."
Applying the Bancroft test, the court found no evidence that the union's
racial message formed the core of the campaign or was racially inflammatory. The bulk of the campaign rhetoric, even though concentrated among
black employees, was found to consist of a color-blind unionist appeal. The
court felt the union's pro-black, pro-union message was a positive effort to
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 926.
Id.
516 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 914 (1976).
516 F.2d at 442.
Id.
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show the economic benefits of unionism to the black worker rather than
an effort to inflame racial hatred.
The court emphatically denied that this decision and its decision in
Bancroft, contrasted with Sewell Manufacturing Co., 8 reflect a racial double standard, to the extent the decisions condone pro-black racial appeals.
Using a curious definition of the term "neutral"-one that in effect sets a
double standard-the court stated:
This decision and Bancroft apply the neutral principle that some degree
of "consciousness-raising" will be permitted in union organizing campaigns among ethnic groups which have historically been economically
disadvantaged, as long as the ethnic message becomes neither the core of
the campaign nor inflammatory.
For such groups, the call to ethnic pride and unity have a strong claim
to congruence with the Union's traditional call to economic betterment.
This cannot be said of appeals to the "ethnic pride" of historically advantaged groups."
Finally, relying upon the rationale in NLRB v. Mansion House Center
Management Corp.,"0 the company contended that the union should be
denied certification because it was unfit as a collective bargaining agent
for all the employees. The court rejected this contention. The refusal to
certify a union was a "drastic step," the court said, and the company was
not entitled to a hearing on this objection without a showing of specific
evidence to demonstrate a pattern of racially discriminatory behavior by
the union.
Third-Party Conduct. The. court continued this year to rely on its
decision.,in Bush Hog, Inc. v.NLRB7 as the controlling authority on
whether alleged third-party misconduct during an election campaign can
be the basis for setting aside a representation election. Under Bush Hog,
conduct not attributable to the opposing party can be relied on to set aside
an election only when the conduct "is so aggravated that a free expression
of choice of representation is impossible." 72
Citing Bush Hog, the court held in FederalElectric Corp. v. NLRB7 that
a Board agent's confusion over obtaining security clearance for an election
at Kennedy Space Center was not so disruptive that a free expression of
choice was impossible. The Board agent conducting the election had disregarded the gate guards and entered the working area without proper security clearance. As a result, the Space Center had to page the Board agent
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
535 F.2d at 929.
473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
420 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1969).
Id. at 1269.
539 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1976).
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three times while the election was in progress and the Board agent had to
close the polls for a short period to explain the situation to the security
office. The company claimed that the closings spawned rumors that the
company had failed to perform its duty of acquiring a clearance badge for
the Board agent. The court, agreeing with the Board, rejected the company's contention that this confusion prejudiced the results of the election.
C.

Cases Under Section 30111

Only two significant cases arising under §301 were decided by the court
this year. One case was an action to enforce an arbitration award, and the
other an action by an employee against his union and employer.
Enforcement of Arbitration Awards. In IAM District 776 v. Texas
Steel Co.,"5 the union sought enforcement of an arbitration award which
found that leadmen were being paid below the hourly rate set forth in the
parties' collective-bargaining agreement. The agreement provided that
leadmen were to be paid "at least $.20 above highest led classification
rate."7 6 The company and the union differed over the "highest led classification rate." The company contended the ground crew members were the
highest paid "led" classification at $2.95 per hour, and the union contended the shipping yard crane operators were the highest paid "led"
classification at $3.38 per hour. Concluding that the leadmen "led" the
crane operators as well as the ground crew members, the arbitrator ruled
in favor of the union.
The Fifth Circuit, noting the parties' dispute was "arguably within the
arbitration clause" 7 and that the arbitration award was "well within the
[judiciall standard which requires that it draw its 'essence' from the
contract,"78 upheld the district court's decision ordering enforcement of the
arbitration award. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the district
court's order that each party bear its own costs and attorneys' fees in the
case, however. The court concluded that these expenses were recoverable
by the union if the district court determined that the company's "refusal
to abide by the arbitration award was without justification."' ,
Duty of Fair Representation."

The court's decision in Tedford v.

74. 29 U.S.C.A. §185 (1970).
75. 538 F.2d 1116.
76. Id. at 1118.
77. Id. at 1120.
78. Id. at 1121 (explanation added).
79. Id. at 1122.
80. The duty of fair representation is derived from §9(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §159(a), which by implication requires that a labor organization
selected as the exclusive bargaining representative must represent all employees in an impartial basis. For a discussion of the elements of a §301 suit by an employee against his employer
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Peabody Coal Co."' is significant because of its extended discussion of the
arbitrariness standard to be applied in fair representation and §301 cases.
The case involved the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, which
was unclear on whether an employee taking a leave of absence to work as
a union officer or representative was entitled to his former job when he
returned to a company.
The plaintiff had returned to Peabody Coal Company after serving more
than two years as a union representative and found his former job as shovel
operator filled. Not wanting to accept a lesser position, he sought reinstatement to his former job. The union determined that the ambiguous contract
provision protected only an employee's seniority while on leave of absence
and not the. right to a former job, and the company acquiesced in this
interpretation. The district court disagreed with the parties' interpretation
and found that the plaintiff was entitled to his former job. The court of
appeals reversed.
The plaintiff contended on appeal that the union had been arbitrary in
its interpretation. Conceding that "the arbitrariness standard is difficult
to define,""2 the court set forth the following criteria for determining arbitrariness: "[W]e think a decision to be nonarbitrary must be (1) based
upon relevant, permissible union factors which excludes the possibility of
it being based upon motivations such as personal animosity or political
favoritism; (2) a rational result of the consideration of those factors; and
(3) inclusive of a fair and impartial consideration of the interests of all
employees." The court then measured the conduct of the union against
the standard set forth. The court observed that the union had to balance
the interests of union members electing union work against the interests
of workers remaining at the mine. The union had considered that if a
returning employee were entitled to his former position, the displaced
employee would have been demoted or rolled back to a lesser position. The
demoted employee would have displaced a junior employee and, in turn,
other employees would have been bumped down the ladder. The union
further had considered that fairness required- allowing workers to bid on
jobs left vacant for unknown periods of time without concern of subsequent
displacement. On this record, the court concluded that the union's interpretation of the leave-of-absence provision was neither irrational nor arbitrary.
The plaintiff also contended on appeal that, in taking a leave of absence,
he had relied on a previous interpretation of the leave-of-absence provision
to the effect that he would be entitled to his former job. Even accepting
and union, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967), and Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
424 U.S. 554 (1976).
81. 553 F.2d 952.
82. Id. at 957.
83. Id. (footnote omitted).
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this contention as true, the court found that the union and the company
had the right to reverse a prior interpretation of the agreement and to
adopt an interpretation which did not entitle an employee to his former
job.
The Peabody decision may be a signal that the court is concerned over
the increasing number of §301 suits filed by individual employees against
employers and unions. The federal labor policy, of course, is to promote
the ongoing day-to-day relationship between an employer and the union
which serves as the statutory bargaining representative for a unit of employees. Differences inevitably will arise among employees over the interpretation of an agreement. If collective bargaining is to be meaningful,
however, the role of the court should not be to interject itself into the
collective-bargaining relationship and second-guess the parties' good-faith
interpretation of a provision contained in a collective-bargaining agreement. The Peabody decision goes a long way in reaffirming this basic
principle of federal labor policy.
D. Contempt-Civil and Criminal
In NLRB v. J. P. Stevens & Co.,58 described by the court as "Stevens

XIV," 81 the court held the J. P. Stevens Company in civil contempt for
disobeying two prior Fifth Circuit decisions" ordering the company to
bargain with the Textile Workers Union as the certified representative of
Stevens' employees at its Statesboro, Georgia, plant.
The court found that the employer had contemptuously failed to bargain
in good faith in (1) granting certain "individual merit" wage increases
without prior notice to or consultation with the union; (2) unilaterally
instituting proceedings with the Pay Board for general wage increases- and
(3) failing to supply, or unreasonably delaying, the supply of. certain requested bargaining data to the union. The court retained jurisdiction for
the purpose of defining the remedy "and for such other and further orders
as may, in the premises, be mete [sic] and proper."8 7
5 8 a union business agent appealed from his
In United States v. Partin,
conviction of criminal contempt for willful disobedience of a temporary
restraining order against a strike in violation of a contractual no-strike
clause. The primary issue on appeal was whether the appellant had the
right to a jury trial. The appellant relied on 18 U.S.C.A. §3692, which
84. 538 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1976).
85. Id. at 1163 n.1.
86. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830
(1971); NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 455 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1971).
87. 538 F.2d at 1166. The penalties imposed for contempt of a bargaining order enforced
by the court can be very severe. See, e.g., NLRB v. Johnson Mfg. Co., 511 F.2d 153, 156-159
(5th Cir. 1975).
88. 524 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1975).
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provides: "In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United
States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any
case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the contempt shall have been committed." 9
While not disputing that the restraining order did grow out of a "labor
dispute" and recognizing that §3692 appeared to support the appellant's
position, the court nevertheless considered itself bound by the recent Supreme Court case of Muniz v. Hoffman." In Muniz, the Supreme Court
had ruled that §3692 does not require a jury. trial in contempt proceedings
arising out of the alleged violation of an injunction entered under §10(1)
of the Labor Management Relations Act"' restraining asserted unfair labor
practices. The Court said that §3692 had originally been enacted as §11 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that §3692 was no broader than its predecessor."
In the judgment of the court of appeals, the critical factor in Muniz was
that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts expressly or impliedly authorized
various kinds of injunctions in labor disputes, and those acts expressly or
impliedly exempted such injunctions from the jurisdictional and procedural limitations of Norris-LaGuardia to the extent necessary to effectuate
their provisions. Since in United States v. Partin,as in Muniz, an injunction was entered "outside the framework of Norris-LaGuardia,"13 the injunction was entitled to the traditional protection of non-jury contempt
proceedings.
E. Cases Under
the Labor-Management Reporting and DisclosureAct
The court considered five cases dealing with the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) 1
In Miller v. Holden,ss the plaintiff claimed that his termination from
employment as training coordinator for an apprenticeship program" was
in retaliation for his support of an unsuccessful candidate for business
manager of the local union. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision dismissing the LMRDA claims directed against the apprenticeship program, which was financed by members of a contractors' associa89. 18 U.S.C.A. §3692 (1964).
90. 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
91. 29 U.S.C.A. §141 (1970).
92. 422 U.S. at 463.
93. Id. at 464.
94. 29 U.S.C.A. §401 (1970).
95. 535 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1976).
96. The plaintiff was employed as training coordinator for the United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States
and Canada, Local No. 198 Education Trust, an entity created for the training of apprentices.
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tion. The apprenticeship program.had a substantial and separate existence
from the local union, the court of appeals said. But the court reversed and
remanded the district court's decision dismissing the LMRDA claims
against the union. The court of appeals ruled that while the plaintiff had
no cause of action under LMRDA §101(a)(5P 7 for unfair "discipline," the
plaintiff had made out a cause of action for denial of equal rights of union
membership and interference with free-speech rights under §101(a)(1) and
§101(a)(2).19
Two of the cases decided under the LMRDA were appeals of criminal
convictions. In upholding a conviction for record-keeping violations, the
court in United States v. Chittenden" held that the president-treasurer of
a local union was a "person" subject to the record-keeping requirements
of the LMRDA and affirmed the district court's refusal to hold that retention of cancelled checks without specific receipts and itemizations was as
a matter of law sufficient "record-keeping" under the LMRDA. In the
second case, United States v. Nell,1'® the court reversed a conviction for
embezzlement of union funds. The court ruled that the district court committed reversible error when during voir dire it (1) denied a challenge for
cause to a juror who admitted a strong dislike for unions and (2) would not
permit further inquiry into possible prejudice of another juror who was a
member of a rival union that had been in a jurisdictional dispute with the
union of which the defendant had been president.
The two remaining cases decided under the LMRDA applied the Supreme Court's- decision in Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers'
Ass'n. 10 1 In that case, the Supreme Court held that an unsupervised election for union officers does not, on grounds of mootness, deprive the Secretary of Labor of his right to a court order declaring a challenged prior
election void and directing that a new election be conducted under his
supervision.
In Usery v. Local 1117, Laborers' InternationalUnion,0 2 the court followed Glass Blowers and ruled, in disagreement with the district court,
that an intervening union election while the case was before the district
court did not deprive the Secretary of his right to invalidate the earlier
election of union officers. McDonald v. Oliver,03 on the other hand, was
an action by the Secretary of Labor to validate, rather than invalidate, a
union election of officers. The district court validated the election, and the
union appealed. While the appeal was pending, the challenged officers
97. 29 U.S.C.A. §411(a)(5) (1970).
98. 29 U.S.C.A. §411(a)(1) and §411(a)(2) (1970).
99. 530 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1976).
100. 526 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1976).
101. 389 U.S. 463 (1968).
102. 536 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1976).
103. 525 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1976).
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completed their terms in office, and'a new election was held. The court of
appeals held that the underlying controversy concerning the validity of the
earlier election was moot and distinguished the Glass Blowers case as being
limited to cases in which the Secretary seeks to invalidate an election
rather than to validate one. The Secretary took the position that an earlier
election was valid.
II.

RAILWAY LABOR

AcT

During the year, the court of appeals decided only one case under the
Railway Labor Act,'"' and it involved the recurring question of the scope
of judicial review of adjustment board decisions.
In United Transportation Union v. Southern Pacific Transportation
Co., 5 the court, consistent with well established Railway Labor Act authority, held that an ambiguous arbitration award should have been remanded for clarification to the adjustment board which had rendered the
decision. The adjustment board had ordered a wrongfully terminated employee reinstated and paid "for his time lost." The railroad paid the employee for "time lost" on the basis of an 8-hour day and a 5-day week, with
no extra pay. The union and the aggrieved employee filed suit for enforcement of the award and claimed what the employee would have earned had
he been allowed to work, including overtime pay and meal-period pay. The
court ordered the ambiguous award remanded to the adjustment board for
clarification of what was meant by "payment for his time lost."

III.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

ACT

AND RELATED LEGISLATION

Except for cases in the area of age discrimination, cases arising under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)" usually apply reasonably well
settled law. This year, however, some of the more significant and interesting cases were decided under the FLSA.
A.

Coverage

07
The court's decision in Thomas v. Louisiana'
is another chapter in the
bizarre and short-lived history of attempting to extend broad coverage of
the FLSA to all employees of state and local governments. The plaintiffs,
employees of various state agencies, sued their employer, the State of
Louisiana, under the FLSA for overtime compensation and won a verdict
for three years' back pay, liquidated damages, and attorney fees. Before

104.
105.
106.
107.

45 U.S.C.A. §151 (1970).
529 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1976).
29 U.S.C.A. §201 (1970).
534 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1976).
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judgment was entered, the Supreme Court held that §16(b) of the FLSA108
did not authorize wage suits by employees against a state. The parties at
that point entered into a settlement by which the State agreed to pay each
plaintiff overtime compensation for two years, but no liquidated damages,
attorney fees or other costs. Shortly thereafter, Congress amended §16(b)
to overturn the Supreme Court's decision and authorized employee suits
against a state.
The plaintiffs then filed suit in district court and persuaded the court
to void the settlement with the state on the basis that the remedy of
liquidated damages cannot be bargained away by a settlement agreement
between an employer and an employee. The court of appeals reversed the
setting aside of the settlement. It held, in a decision likely limited to the
unique facts of the case, that settlement during the hiatus after the Supreme Court's decision and before the congressional amendment to §16(b)
was fair and equitable and should not have been set aside. Ironically, after
this litigation, the Supreme Court held in National League of Cities v.
Usery'09 that the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA
cannot constitutionally be applied to state, county and municipal governments.
B.

Employee Status

In Usery v. Pilgrim Equipment Co.," 0 the court held that 60 women
operators of laundry pick-up stations were not independent contractors but
rather were employees and thus subject to the full provisions of the FLSA,
including the payment of minimum wage and overtime. The pick-up stations, to which customers brought items to be cleared, were leased to
individual operators on a commission basis. The operation contracted with
Pilgrim to provide cleaning service, which included picking up, cleaning
and returning the items. The operator then made delivery to the customer
and collected for herself the cleaning price.
In a well-reasoned decision spelling out the factors to be considered when
there is a claim of independent-contractor status, the court stressed that
"economic dependence" is the dominant consideration. The court identified five indicia as aids to making the determination of economic dependence: "degree of control, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in
facilities, permanency of relation, and skill required.""' The court noted
that:
No one of these considerations can become the final determinant, nor can
the collective answers to all of the inquiries produce a resolution which
108. 29 U.S.C.A. §216(b) (1964).
109.
110.
111.

U.S. __, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1976).
527 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1311.
-
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submerges consideration of the dominant factor-economic dependence.
..The five tests are aids-tools to be used to gauge the degree of dependence of alleged employees on the business with which they are connected.
It is dependence that indicates employee 2status. Each test must be applied with that ultimate notion in mind."
Analyzing each of these factors, the court, in strong disagreement with
the district court, found that the operators of the laundry pick-up stations
were not allowed to control any meaningful portion of the business they
allegedly owned and ran. The operators had no meaningful opportunity for
profit or loss, since, for example, Pilgrim regulated prices, location and
advertising. The operators had no risk capital in the business, and they
were not capable of terminating relations with Pilgrim and doing business
elsewhere. Finally, the operators had no unique or highly developed skill
or initiative in performing their jobs. On this record, the court concluded,
"The degree of dependence by the operators upon Pilgrim . . .mandates
the conclusion that the operators are employees under the FLSA." 3
C.

Exemptions

The major issue in Usery v. Associated Drugs, Inc."Iwas the interpretation of a statutory exemption under the FLSA. The case involved the
exemption contained in §13(a)(2)"I from the minimum-wage, overtime
and record-keeping requirements of the FLSA for any employee having less
that $250,000 in annual sales.
The Secretary of Labor, relying on an Interpretive Bulletin issued by the
Wage and Hour Division,"' had sought to apply the "rolling quarter"
method in computing the $250,000 annual dollar-volume of sales. This
method of computation permits the Secretary of Labor to use the 12-month
period which immediately precedes the quarter-year being tested for determining whether an establishment's annual dollar-volume is less than
$250,000. The company, on the other hand, had sought to use its preceding
fiscal year for determining the annual dollar-volume of sales, arguing that
the "rolling quarter" method of computation would require adjustment of
employee wages on a quarterly basis depending always on whether the
sales in the preceding 12-month period exceeded $250,000.
Noting that the Interpretive Bulletin was not binding on the court and
recognizing the impracticality of requiring a company to adjust employee
wages on a quarterly basis, the court held, on "the record in this case""'
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1311 (emphasis in original).

115.
116.

29 U.S.C.A. §213(a)(2) (1964).
29 C.F.R. §779.266(b) (1975).

117.

538 F.2d at 1193.

Id.at 1315.
538 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1976).
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and in agreement with the district court, that the method of calculating
annual sales should be on the establishment's preceding fiscal year rather
than the "rolling quarter" method.
Using the fiscal year for computing annual sales, the court, again in
agreement with the district court, found that there were two years in which
the company did not qualify for an exemption under §13(a)(2) and that
back wages were owed to employees for those years. The district court,
however, had found that during those years four pharmacists were exempt
as professionals from the minimum-wage, overtime and record-keeping
requirements under §13(a)(1).118 The court of appeals reversed this finding
with little discussion. It ruled that the pharmacists were not paid on a
salary basis as required for a professional exemption."'
The court also reversed the district court's decision not to award prejudgment interest on the amounts found to be due employees as back
wages, because it is "well established that prejudgment interest should be
allowed on the amounts found to be due.'1
D.

Hours Worked

Dunlop v. City Electric, Inc.'2 1 involved the question whether the starting tasks performed by employee electricians and helpers during the fifteen
to twenty minutes prior to departing the electrical shop for various job sites
were compensable under the overtime provisions of the FLSA,' or were
"preliminary activities" subject to the excepting language of the Portalto-Portal Act. 23 The starting tasks performed by the employees included
filling out daily time sheets and material sheets, checking job locations,
loading the trucks with materials for the day, servicing the trucks, and
picking up electrical plans for the day's job.
The district court had found that most of the tasks, including the paper
work and servicing of the trucks, fell within the Portal-to-Portal exception
and were therefore not compensable. It was the district court's view that
most of the tasks were preliminary to the employee's principal activity,
"the installation and repair of electrical wiring.' ' 2 The district court also
had found that the'remaining tasks that "may" have been compensable
118. 29 U.S.C.A. §213(a)(1) (1964).
119. 29 C.F.R. §541.3 (1975) prescribes the standards of the Wage and Hour Division for
the determination of an "employee employed in a bona fide ... professional capacity," within
the exemption of 29 U.S.C.A. §213(a)(1) (1964).
120. 538 F.2d 1194.
121. 527 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1976).
122. 29 U.S.C.A. §207 (1964).
123. 29 U.S.C.A. §254(a)(2) (1970) relieves employers from back-wage liability under the
FLSA for time spent by their employees in "activities which are preliminary to . . . [their]
principal activity or activities" and which occur "prior to the time on any particular workday
at which [the] employee commences . . such principal activity or activities."
124. 527 F.2d at 400.
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under the overtime provisions, such as the picking up of plans and loading
of supplies, required so little time that they were de minimis and were
therefore not compensable.
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, ruling that the principal activities of the employees had been too narrowly defined. The court said
that the phrase "principal activity or activities" was intended to be read
broadly to include any tasks "deemed an integral and indispensable part
of the employer's operations as a whole, though not directly related to any
single principal activity."'' 5 The test to determine which activities are
"principal" and thus compensable, said the court, is whether the activities
are "performed as part of the regular work of the employees in the ordinary
26
course of business."'
Applying the enunciated test to the facts of the case, the court concluded
that the tasks performed by the employees before departing the electrical
shop were within the broad range of "principal activities" performed as
part of the regular work and thus were compensable under the FLSA. The
case was remanded to the district court for a further determination of
whether all the activities combined still resulted in such a slight expenditure of time that they were de minimis and therefore not compensable on
this separate and independent basis.
E. Injunctive Relief
In Dunlop v. Davis,'2 reversing the district court, the court held that the
Secretary of Labor was entitled to a permanent injunction against future
violations of the minimum-wage, overtime and record-keeping requirements of the FLSA.
The company in that case had been investigated by a compliance officer
from the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. This investigation had revealed that the company was violating the compensation
and record-keeping provisions of the FLSA and that back wages were owed
to 16 employees. The company had agreed to pay the back wages and
subsequently had sent the Department of Labor forms indicating that
payment in full had been made to each employee. A follow-up investigation by the Department of Labor had revealed that eight of the employees
had not received any or all of the payments due them. The district court
granted the Secretary of Labor's request for injunctive relief requiring the
employer to pay the back wages owed to the eight employees, but had
denied the request for a prospective injunction against all future violations
of the FLSA. The district court said the company had ceased any violations following the discovery by the compliance officer in his initial investi125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 401.
524 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975).
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gation and had not resumed them by the time of the trial.
The court of appeals, reversing, held that the two factors properly to be
considered in determining whether a permanent injunction should be
granted "are the previous conduct of the employer and the dependability
of his promises for future compliance."' 28 Noting the employer's attempt
to avoid the payment of admittedly due back wages, the falsification of
forms indicating receipt by employees, and misrepresentations to the Department of Labor, the court could find no indication that violations of the
FLSA would not resume in the future without an injunction against future
violations.
F.

Age Discrimination

Three 1975 cases arose under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA).'" The most significant decision was Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 1'o
which concerned the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exemption of §4(f)(1)13 1 as it applies to the intercity bus
industry.
A prima facie case of age discrimination had been made by two intercity
bus-driver applicants between the ages of 40 and 65, the protected age
category, so the burden of proving justification for Tamiami's hiring policy
was shifted to the employer. Since safe transportation of passengers was
essential to Tamiami's operations, the district court had ruled that the
employer could sustain its burden of proof by (1) showing it had a factual
basis for believing that without a general rule excluding older applicants,
3
its business operations (and safety obligations) would be undermined;
and (2) demonstrating that it was impractical to deal with each applicant
over age 40 on an individual basis by considering his particular functional
33
ability to safely perform driver duties.
The court of appeals affirmed. It found no clear error in the district
128. Id. at 1281.
129. 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 (1970).
130. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
131. 29 U.S.C.A. §623(f)(1) provides an exception to the ADEA prohibitions against age
discrimination, as follows: "(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer ... (1) to take any
action otherwise prohibited under subsection[s] (a) .. .of this section where age is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age ......
132. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
133. The latter test evolved from footnote 5 of the court of appeals opinion in Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the court found
sex discrimination that was prohibited by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. There the court of
appeals commented: "It may be that where an employer sustains its burden of demonstrating
that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with women on an individualized basis, it
may apply a reasonable general rule."
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court's decision that age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the safe operation of the intercity bus line.1'3
In two other age-discrimination cases, Woodburn v. LTV Aerospace
Corp.131
and Hays v. Republic Steel Corp.,' 31 the court rejected as untimely
claims filed without prior compliance with the 180-day notice requirement
of ADEA. 37
In Woodburn, the more interesting of the two cases, the court faced the
question whether a discriminatory discharge and failure to re-employ the
plaintiff amounted to a continuing violation that tolled the 180-day notice
3
requirement. In a 1974 decision, Powell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
the court had rejected a similar "continuing violation" argument after the
plaintiff had alleged a discriminatory failure to hire. In Woodburn, however, the court went further than in Powell. In Powell, the notice had been
filed more than 180 days after the employer had hired the last person to
fill the vacancy the plaintiff had sought. In Woodburn, hiring and firing
in jobs similar to the plaintiff's continued after the plaintiff's discharge.
Unimpressed with this distinction, the court concluded that to say continued hiring of others transforms a discharge into a continuing violation
would seriously impair the mediation and reconciliation purposes of the
notice provision. The court said that
the critical factor in finding a continuing violation [after an] . . . initial
layoff [is] .. .the repeated refusal of the company to rehire the plaintiff
in accordance with [his] seniority rights as provided for in [a] collective
bargaining agreement. ...LTV had no contractual obligation to rehire
Woodburn.
The court also found no evidence of "overt documented company policies,"'' 0 which might constitute an excuse for late notice.',
In Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., in addition to ruling on the 180-day
notice requirement, the court reviewed the matter of when liquidated damages are to be awarded under the ADEA. While §7(b)4 of the ADEA
134. Accord, Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
135. 531 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1976).
136. 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
137. 29 U.S.C.A. §626(d) provides: "No civil action may be commenced ...until the
[plaintiff] .

.

.has given the Secretary [of Labor] .

.

.notice of an intent to file such action

...within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred."
138. 494 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1974).
139. 531 F.2d at 751.
140. 494 F.2d at 489.
141. See Hays v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976). Compare Edwards
v. Kaiser Aluminim & Chem. Sales, Inc., 515 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the court
found it unnecessary to decide whether in some cases an employer's failure to post required
notices relating to the ADEA might excuse a plaintiff's noncompliance with the 180-day
provision.
142. 29 U.S.C.A. §626 (1970).
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provides that liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful
violations, the court did not consider that liquidated damages must always
be payable if there is a willful violation, regardless of the employer's good
faith. "For the Court's discretion to be invoked," the court said, "the
employer must show that his failure was both in good faith and predicated
upon such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to impose liquidated
damages upon him."''
IV.

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

ACT

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)'44 continues to generate litigation, with six cases being decided by the court last year.
A.

Jurisdiction

In Southern Pacific TransportationCo. v. Usery,"5 the court discussed
the relationship of OSHA to certain other federal and state laws. In three
cases consolidated for hearing, railroads had petitioned for review of an
order of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRECOM)"I finding violations of the Act. The common question presented
was whether the railroads, at the time certain violations occurred, were
obliged to comply with safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of
Labor under OSHA. The cases turned on the meaning of OSHA §4(b)(1),' 47
which states: "Nothing in this chapter [which encompasses the complete
text of OSHA] shall apply to working conditions of employees with respect
to which other Federal agencies and State agencies acting under Section
2021 of Title 42, exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety or health."
The railroads argued in favor of an industry-wide exemption. They contended that §4(b)(1) means that any exercise by the department of Transportation (DOT), acting through the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), of its statutory authority to regulate railroad safety exempts the
railroad industry from OSHA regulations to the full extent of DOT's potential regulatory authority.
Rejecting the railroads' position,' the court nonetheless also rejected
the theory that every OSHA regulation remains in effect until the FRA
adopts a regulation of its own on that specific subject. In the court's view:
143. 531 F.2d at 1309 n.3 (citation omitted).
144. 29 U.S.C.A. §651 (1970).
145. 539 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1976).
146. This acronym was first suggested in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Rev. Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990, 992 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44
U.S.L.W. 3331 (U.S., Nov. 21, 1975) (No. 75-746).
147. 29 U.S.C.A. §653(b)(1) (1970).
148. A similar result had been reached earlier in the year by the Fourth Circuit in Southern Ry. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Neither OSHA itself nor the existence of OSHA regulations affects the
ability of the primary regulatory agency, here the FRA, to articulate its
regulations as it chooses. Much of their displacing effect will turn on that
articulation. Section 4(b)(1) means that any FRA exercise directed at a
working condition. . . displaces OSHA coverage of that working condition.
Thus, comprehensive FRA treatment of the general problem of railroad
fire protection will displace all OSHA regulations on fire protection, even
if the FRA activity does not encompass every detail of the OSHA fire
protection standards, but FRA regulation of portable fire extinguishers
will not displace OSHA standards on fire alarm signaling systems.',
B.

Standards of Employer Responsibility

In two other OSHA cases, with differing results, the court discussed the
extent of employer responsibility for the acts of negligent employees.
In Getty Oil Co. v. OccupationalSafety & Health Review Commission,11
Getty Oil Company sought review of an order finding Getty guilty of a
serious violation and assessing a fine.
Getty operated a "separation facility," which gathered gas and oil from
oil wells and transmitted them, at higher pressures, to an outgoing pipeline. Getty's area engineer instructed one of the company's field mechanics, Robison, to have a certain pressure vessel fabricated and pressuretested at a local welding shop for installation in a high-pressure pipeline.
The area engineer emphasized to Robison the necessity for pressure-testing
the vessel before placing it into operation. For unknown reasons, Robison
later picked up the vessel from the welding shop, even though the shop
owner told him the vessel had not yet been pressure-tested. During a
telephone conversation that same morning, the area engineer talked briefly
with Robison but failed to ask him whether the vessel had been pressuretested. Later that day, when Robison activated the pressure vessel, there
was an explosion, which killed Robison and severely burned the production
foreman.
Getty later was charged with violating the "general duty" section of the
Act.' 5' To establish a violation of the general duty section, the Secretary
149. 539 F.2d at 391. Since the court concluded that existing FRA regulations did not
displace OSHA coverage, it was unnecessary to consider whether the FRA had exceeded its
statutory authority or whether the FRA's authority would permit it to preempt OSHA
through future regulations. Intervenors, the United Transportation Union and the AFL-CIO,
had argued that the most comprehensive source of the FRA's authority to regulate railroad
safety, the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §421 (1970), does not empower the FRA
to regulate the working conditions involved in these cases, either because they are not peculiar
to rail transportation or because they raise health, as opposed to safety, issues. 539 F.2d at
389 n.3.
150. 530 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1976).
151. 29 U.S.C.A. §654(a)(1) (1970) requires every employer to "furnish to each of his
employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees."
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of Labor must prove (1) that the employer failed to render its work place
free of a hazard which was (2) recognized and (3) which caused or was
likely to cause death or serious physical harm. 152 In the court's view:
The section is intended neither to impose liability on the employer for an
employee's negligence on a respondeatsuperior basis, nor to create a standard of absolute liability. The clause instead requires employers to discover and exclude from the work place "[aill [feasibly] preventable
forms and instances of hazardous conduct."'' u
The court observed that under §17(k) of the Act,'54 Getty could not be
found guilty of a "serious" violation unless it did not, and could not "with
the exercise of reasonable diligence," know of the presence of the violation.
Since it was undisputed that the company did not have actual knowledge
that the vessel had not been pressure-tested, the sole remaining issue was
' 5
whether Getty could have discovered that fact by "reasonable diligence."' 1
Getty's defense was that the violation was attributable solely to Robison
and that the company had itself fully discharged its statutory duties. The
company relied heavily on Robison's 30 years' experience with Getty, his
reputation for being a responsible employee, and the fact that he had been
repeatedly reminded by the area engineer of the necessity for pressuretesting.
The court noted that on the two previous occasions when Robison had
installed similar pressure vessels, the same area engineer had actually
ascertained before activating the vessels that they had been pressuretested. The court considered that the area engineer had at least one opportunity to make a similar determination on the day Robison installed the
defective vessel. In addition, neither of the two company supervisors present at the site when Robison installed the vessel, had asked him whether
the vessel had been tested. In light of the "negligible effort" required to
determine whether the necessary testing had been performed, the high
likelihood of serious injury without the testing, the company's knowledge
of that danger, and the company's opportunities to question Robison on
the matter, the court found substantial evidence to support the Commission's determination that Getty failed to exercise "reasonable diligence."
Judge Gee dissented, concluding that the majority's holding "imposes a
continuous supervision rule on employers: given an experienced employee
who knows what he is supposed to do, and given that he had been told to
do so N times, then the number of times that he should have been told to
do so is N + 1."'15
152. 530 F.2d at 1145, citing National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257,
1265 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
153. 530 F.2d at 1145 (citation omitted) (emphasis and additions in original).
154. 29 U.S.C.A. §666(j) (1970).
155. 530 F.2d at 1145.
156. Id. at 1148.
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In another case, Home Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OccupationalSafety
and Health Review Commission,157 the employer was found not to be liable
for an employee's negligent acts, even'though that employee was a foreman. Petitioner Home was a sole proprietorship with approximately 11
employees. During trench excavations, two Home employees had been
killed by a cave-in while working in an unshored area. It was undisputed
that Home had an outstanding sdfety program for a small employer, held
group safety meetings with his employees, conducted on-the-job meetings
with individuals, and issued written handouts concerning safety and the
requirements of OSHA. Both men killed in the accident were experienced
foremen and journeymen plumbers. Each had been licensed for over 20
years. Both were trained and highly experienced in the use of shoring and
had always used shoring properly in previous jobs.
OSHRECOM had found that Home was diligent in providing for his
employees' safety and that his foremen understood his safety policy and
instructions. It also appeared that Home had no reason to believe his
policy and instructions would be disregarded by his foremen. Nevertheless,
OSHRECOM found a "serious violation" on an agency theory. In OSHRECOM's opinion, since the job foreman was part of management, the employer could not avoid responsibility under the Act by charging that his
foreman had failed to meet the required safety standards.
The court agreed with OSHRECOM that Home had done everything
possible to ensure compliance with the law short of remaining on the job
site and directing the operations himself. The court considered that it
and infeasible" to require
would be "wholly unnecessary, unreasonable,
158
Home to direct the operation personally.
The remaining question was whether Home was properly held liable for
his foreman's derelictions under the imputation theory used by the Commission. The court found this approach erroneous as a matter of law, since
it amounted to the imposition of a strict liability standard." 9 The court
concluded that it would be inconsistent with the purposes and policies of
the Act and contrary to the express language of §17(k) to penalize Home
for violations of which he had no knowledge, which he could not have
foreseen, and which he had taken such elaborate measures to prevent.
Citing the words of the Commission, the violations were 0said to be "an
'16
unpreventable occurrence which could not be predicted.
157.
158.

528 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 570.

159. The court relied in part upon a recent Ninth Circuit decision holding that employer
knowledge is an element of proof of OSHA violations, and that the burden is on the Secretary
of Labor to prove that knowledge rather than on the employer to prove its absence. Brennan
v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975).

160. Id. at 571 (citation omitted).
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C. Judicial Construction of Regulations
The issue of "when is a roof a floor?" was raised in Diamond Roofing
Co. v. OccupationalSafety and Health Review Commission'1 when three
roofing companies petitioned for review of OSHRECOM orders. OSHRECOM had found that the employers had improperly failed to treat a regulation requiring that a standard railing shall be placed around an "opensided floor' ' 2 as also applying to open-sided roofs.
The court reversed the rulings of OSHRECOM in a decision of more
interest for its approach to judicial review of Commission orders than in
terms of the specific safety regulations involved. In the court's opinion, had
the drafters of the regulation intended that it apply to open-sided roofs,
they could have and should have said so, as they had in related regulations:
"If the regulation missed its mark, the fault lies in the wording of the
regulation-a matter easily remedied under the flexible regulation promulgating structure ... with no need to press limits by judicial construction
in an industrial area presenting infinite operational situations."'6 3 The
court considered that, like other statutes and regulations which establish
monetary penalties, an occupational safety and health standard must give
an employer fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires and must
provide a reasonably clear standard of culpability to circumscribe the discretion of the enforcing authority and its agents. "To strain the plain and
natural meaning of words for the purpose of alleviating a perceived safety
hazard is to delay the day when the occupational safety and health regulations will be written in clear and concise language so that employers will
be better able to understand and observe them," the court said.'
D. Emergency Temporary Standards
Section 6(c)115 of the Act grants the Secretary of Labor extraordinary
powers to issue without notice or hearing emergency temporary standards
effective for up to six months. When the Secretary published in the Federal
Register certain emergency temporary standards for diving operations, the
petitioners in Taylor Diving & Salvage v. U.S. Department of Labor 6 '
sought a stay of the effective date of those standards. Concluding that the
161. 528 F.2d 645.
162. 29 C.F.R. §1926.500(d)(1) (1976).
163. 528 F.2d at 648-649 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 650. The court noted that at that time, 982 fine-print, double-columned pages
were needed to set out the occupational safety and health standards in Title 29, Chapter XVII
of the Code of Federal Regulations.
165. 29 U.S.C.A. §665(c) (1970) provides that Emergency Temporary Standards shall be
issued if the Secretary determines that employees are exposed to grave danger from substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new hazards and that
an emergency standards is necessary to protect employees from such danger.
166. 537 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1976).
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employers' prospects of prevailing on the merits were good and that the
danger of irreparable harm had been shown, the court granted a stay
pending appeal. The court reiterated its view that the extraordinary powers granted by the Secretary in §6(c) " 'should be delicately exercised, and
only in those emergency situations which require it.' ""7
The remaining OSHA decision, Shaw Construction,Inc. v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission,""raised a procedural point. After
an administrative law judge decided that two serious safety violations had
occurred, the employer petitioned OSHRECOM for, and was granted, discretionary review by the full Commission." 9 Since one of OSHRECOM's
three commissioners had resigned and had not been replaced at the time
of the review, only two commissioners participated. Both concurred in
affirming the first violation, but the second was affirmed by only a oneto-one vote.
The court found no Commission error on the first violation, but it remanded the decision on the second. The statutory provisions governing the
Commission's discretionary review powers were considered not to permit
official Commission action without the affirmative vote of at least two
members.
167. Id. at 821, quoting Florida Peach Grower's Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d
120, 129-130 (5th Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted).
168. 534 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1976).
169. See 29 U.S.C.A. §661(i) (1970).

